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Intentional binding (IB) refers to the temporal attraction between a voluntary action and
its sensory consequence. Since its discovery in 2002, it has been considered to be a
valid implicit measure of sense of agency (SoA), since it only occurs in the context of
voluntary actions. The vast majority of studies considering IB have recruited young adults
as participants, while neglecting possible age-related differences. The aim of the present
work is to study the development of IB in 10-year-old children. In place of Libet’s classical
clock method, we decided to implement a new and more suitable paradigm in order to
study IB, since children could have some difficulties in dealing with reading clocks. A
stream of unpredictable letters was therefore used: participants had to remember which
letter was on the screen when they made a voluntary action, heard a sound, or felt their
right index finger moved down passively. In Experiment I, a group of young adults was
tested in order to replicate the IB effect with this new paradigm. In Experiment II, the
same paradigm was then administered to children in order to investigate whether such an
effect has already emerged at this age. The data from Experiment I showed the presence
of the IB effect in adults. However, Experiment II demonstrated a clear reduction of IB.
The comparison of the two groups revealed that the young adult group differed from the
children, showing a significantly stronger linkage between actions and their consequences.
The results indicate a developmental trend in the IB effect. This finding is discussed in light
of the maturation process of the frontal cortical network.
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INTRODUCTION
The feeling of generating and controlling actions and their exter-
nal effects is known as sense of agency (SoA; Haggard and Tsakiris,
2009). When we act, we are generally in control of what we are
doing; therefore, we are aware and responsible for both our own
actions and their consequences.
For many years, researchers have tried to identify appropriate
measures to study this complex phenomenon. Two main research
lines can be distinguished (Synofzik et al., 2008). The first refers to
agency at its explicit level: usually, explicit agency is investigated
by tasks in which participants have to verbally report whether
they feel they are the authors of a certain effect or whether a
presented sensory feedback of an action corresponds to the action
made (Wegner and Wheatley, 1999; Aarts et al., 2005; Sato and
Yasuda, 2005; Daprati et al., 2007; Metcalfe and Greene, 2007;
Tsakiris et al., 2007; Farrer et al., 2008). However, we experience
a continuous flow of actions and their effects in our everyday life,
and we do know that we are the authors of an action without
constantly giving explicit judgments. The second research line
on SoA involves implicit measures, such as intentional binding
(IB; Haggard et al., 2002). Such an effect occurs when a tem-
poral compression phenomenon between voluntary action and
its consequent effect is observed (e.g., actions are perceived as
occurring later than they really do, while the sensory effect is
perceived as occurring earlier). This effect seems to be limited to
voluntary actions; in fact, IB is absent or reduced for situations in
which the action is not driven by volition (e.g., passively-induced
movement) or when no intentional agent is present (Haggard
et al., 2002; Haggard and Clark, 2003; Engbert et al., 2008). Since
its discovery, IB has been considered a valid quantitative index
of SoA and has been applied to study agency, both in healthy
individuals and clinical populations (for a review, see Moore and
Obhi, 2012).
Up to the present moment, studies on SoA in general—and
IB in particular—have concentrated most of their attention on
searching for the underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms
(David et al., 2008; Moore et al., 2010; David, 2012; Moore and
Obhi, 2012; Kühn et al., 2013; Jo et al., 2014), without considering
the aspect of ontogenetic development. A recent study conducted
by Metcalfe et al. (2010) tried to study the possible differences
in SoA across lifespans. The authors compared children, young
adults, and older participants’ performance using a computer
game in which the task was to click on Xs and avoid Os. At times,
the game included random distortions that decreased control. The
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participants had to judge how in control they felt and to rate their
accuracy. The results showed that young adults were the most
sensitive to discrepancies in control over their actions, as well as
demonstrating their awareness of whether they were in control,
compared to both children (8–10 years old) and older adults
(mean age 75). Overall, these results showed that the metacog-
nition of agency changes across the lifespan, suggesting a possible
developmental trend. Although being the first to investigate age-
related differences in SoA, this study used an explicit agency
task, which may be influenced by different biases, such as prior
expectations and beliefs about the task (Gawronski et al., 2007);
thus, it says very little about the experience of agency, since it
does not reflect or capture the feeling of agency that accompanies
normal voluntary action (Synofzik et al., 2013).
In addition to Metcalfe et al.’s study, other studies have tried
to investigate the emergence of agency. On one hand, stud-
ies focusing on the sense of the body (body awareness—for a
review, see Rochat, 2010) and on the phenomenon of action–
effect learning (Elsner and Aschersleben, 2003; Eenshuistra et al.,
2004; Hauf et al., 2004; Elsner, 2007) show that: (i) the sense of
body is already present in the first few months of life. Infants
can therefore be considered agents in the world because they
begin to gain control of their bodies and move voluntarily in
the environment. In addition; (ii) action-effect learning seems
to emerge even before the first year of age (Verschoor et al.,
2010). On the other hand, other studies have shown that only
5-year-old children can report a mature experience of agency
(Shultz et al., 1980; Astington, 2001; Lang and Perner, 2002).
For example, Shultz et al. demonstrated that 5-year-old children
are able to distinguish between a voluntary movement of the
leg and a knee-jerk reflex However, all of the aforementioned
studies—although aimed at studying the emergence of agency—
are characterized by two important limits: (i) they contradict the
fact that volition, which is strictly linked to the concept of agency,
matures late during an individual’s development (Haggard, 2008),
when the brain, in particular the frontal areas, reaches its full
maturation (Giedd et al., 1999; Sowell et al., 1999); and (ii) they
focus on low-level processes implicated in agency that are con-
sidered to be necessary conditions for the appearance of goal-
directed behavior and action control, but are not sufficient to
explain SoA’s complexity, which is rather a more sophisticated
process. It includes in fact the ability to plan and control actions
(planning, for example, to do something), but also the ability to
identify actions’ consequences in the external world inhibiting
erroneous behavior. SoA is therefore linked to the concept of
responsibility (Moll et al., 2007; Frith, 2013, 2014): we are aware
and responsible of what our actions produce. If, for example,
I fight with someone and decide to voluntarily hit him/her, I
am aware of the consequences that my action could produce
(e.g., this person could fall down and injure himself, and I am
aware of this). However, if the agent is a child, this feeling of
being responsible for action consequences may not emerge in
the same way. Below a certain age, children are not considered
responsible for their actions: the minimum age of responsibility
is the topic of important legal debates and varies from 7–18 years
old (Frith, 2013, 2014). The general idea is that children may not
be considered to be fully responsible for their own actions—and
consequently not complete “agents”—since their frontal lobes are
not fully matured yet (Moll et al., 2007; Mackintosh, 2011; Frith,
2013, 2014). In this sense it could be interesting to know how and
when SoA develop.
The general purpose of the present work is therefore to under-
stand how IB, as an implicit measure of SoA, can develop in
children, by corroborating the existing literature, going beyond
the basic aspects of agency, and overcoming the limits of the
verbal reports that characterize the explicit level of SoA. If this
background feeling of agency is innate, we could expect the same
pattern to be found in young adults, or rather the temporal com-
pression between voluntary action and sensory effects; otherwise,
if IB is something that we acquire during our development, we
could expect some differences between young adults and children.
The present study consists of two main experiments. In the
first experiment (Experiment I), we sought to develop a new
paradigm in order to assess IB at the implicit level. This purpose
stems from the fact that the majority of studies uses either (i)
the rotating spot method used by Libet et al. in 1983 (Libet
et al., 1983; Haggard et al., 2002; Haggard and Clark, 2003;
Haggard and Cole, 2007) or (ii) direct numerical judgments of
the time interval between an action and its effect (Engbert et al.,
2007, 2008; Cravo et al., 2009; Humphreys and Buehner, 2009).
However, these approaches do not fit our case, since the rotating
clock method could raise some problems with children, given
the fact that the acquisition of both clock and time knowledge
changes and improves with age (Vakali, 1991). In addition, time
interval paradigms do not allow for the separate measurement
of action binding (i.e., the shift of the action towards the effect)
and effect binding (i.e., the shift of the effect towards the action),
which seem to rely on different neural mechanisms (Moore et al.,
2010; Wolpe et al., 2013). Therefore, the aim of Experiment I
was to replicate the IB effect in a group of young adults using
a new and more suitable paradigm, in order to test it later in
children (Experiment II). We considered the method developed
by Soon et al. (2008) to study the brain processes associated
with the preparation of intentional actions as a reference point
using a stream of letters. In this way, both the problem of the
predictability of numbers using a clock and the problem of inac-
curacy in time judgments, which can occur with rotating stimuli
(van de Grind, 2002), can be avoided. In the second experiment
(Experiment II), we tested IB in a group of 10-year-old children
in order to investigate whether such an effect has already emerged
at this age.
EXPERIMENT I
The aim of Experiment I was twofold: (i) to create a paradigm
suitable to test IB in children; and (ii) to test this paradigm
in a group of young adults in order to verify the possibility of
replicating the IB effect. In the case of replicating the IB effect in
adults, the same paradigm would be adopted to test the IB effect
in children in Experiment II.
METHOD
Participants
Twenty participants (16 females; mean age in years: 23, SD:
1.41; education in years: 16.6, SD: 0.94) took part in the
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study. All participants were right-handed, as measured by the
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971), had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision, and lacked neurological and
psychiatric pathologies. The study was conceived according to
the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the Ethics
Committee of the University of Padua. All participants gave their
informed, written consent to participate in the study.
Apparatus and procedure
The experiment took place in a dimly illuminated room. The
stimuli were presented on a 17-inch monitor controlled by a
Pentium four PC programmed with E-Prime two (Psychology
Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). The participants were seated
comfortably in a chair at a viewing distance of 60 cm from
the monitor. They were asked to passively observe a stream of
unpredictable white, capital consonants at the center of a black
screen. In order to prevent the participants from responding
immediately after the occurrence of the letters, a series of random-
ized white numbers was displayed before the letters’ presentation
(Figure 1). Each number and letter was presented separately
and lasted for 150 ms, without time gaps in between. At the
end of each trial, a set of response options (called “response
mapping”) appeared on the screen. Five letters were presented
on the screen, including the target letter (i.e., the letter that
was on the screen at the actual appearance of the event of
interest). After each trial, the participants had to choose the
correct consonant using the keyboard with their left hand. We
decided to introduce “response mapping” in order to avoid the
significant involvement of a memory retrieval component in the
task.
The experiment consisted of 4 baseline conditions (BCs) and
6 experimental conditions (ECs), for a total of 10 conditions
(Table 1).
Among the BCs (Figure 2A), only one event among volun-
tary action, involuntary action, Tone 1, or Tone 2 occurred per
condition. The participants had to remember which consonant
was on the screen when (1) they made a free voluntary key-
press with their right index finger (acting as a baseline for vol-
untary action condition); (2) they felt their right index finger
being passively moved down by a mechanical device (acting as
a baseline for involuntary action condition); (3) they heard an
auditory stimulus presented through headphones (1,000 Hz, 100-
ms duration; baseline for tone condition: Tone 1); or (4) they
heard another auditory control stimulus presented by headphones
(same duration as Tone 1 but with a different pitch; baseline for
tone control condition, Tone 2). In Condition (1), the participants
had to wait until the letters’ appearance before responding, in
order to avoid response anticipation (i.e., a key-press performed
immediately after the trial onset). In Condition (2), a mechanical
device was applied to the right index finger of the participants.
The device was connected and activated by computer at a random
interval after the trial’s onset. When the computer gave the input,
the key and, consequently, the right index finger moved down,
giving the participant the same physical perception as the volun-
tary key-press.
For the ECs, two events occurred per condition (Figure 2B).
The participants had to judge (5) the onset of the voluntary
action that produced Tone 1; (6) the onset of Tone 1 caused
by the voluntary action; (7) the onset of the involuntary action
that was followed by Tone 1; (8) the onset of Tone 1 activated
FIGURE 1 | Schematic illustration of the task structure. Participants
passively observed a stream of numbers and letters that was updated
every 150 ms. The frame with “. . .” represented here the continuous flow
either of numbers or letters. After the appearance of the event of interest
(Voluntary Action, Involuntary Action, Tone 1, Tone 2) a response mapping
appeared and participants chose the letter that was on the screen at the
occurrence of the event of interest (e.g., Voluntary Action, Involuntary
Action, Tone 1, Tone 2).
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Table 1 | Conditions (Baseline and Experimental) and event judged by
the participants in each condition.
Condition Event judged
Baseline Conditions
1) Voluntary Action Voluntary Action
2) Involuntary Action Involuntary Action
3) Baseline Tone (Tone 1) Baseline Tone (Tone 1)
4) Control Tone (Tone 2) Control Tone (Tone 2)
Experimental Conditions
5) Voluntary Action—250 ms—Tone 1 Voluntary Action
6) Voluntary Action—250 ms—Tone 1 Tone 1
7) Involuntary Action—250 ms—Tone 1 Involuntary Action
8) Involuntary Action—250 ms—Tone 1 Tone 1
9) Control Tone (Tone 2)—250 ms—Tone 1 Control Tone (Tone 2)
10) Control Tone (Tone 2)—250 ms—Tone 1 Tone 1
Among the baseline conditions, only one event occurred per condition (e.g.,
voluntary action, involuntary action, Tone 1, Tone 2). For the experimental
conditions, two events occurred per condition. The time interval between the
first event (the voluntary action, the involuntary action, or Tone 2) and the second
event (Tone 1) was set at 250 ms.
by the involuntary action; (9) the onset of Tone 2 followed by
Tone 1; (10) the onset of Tone 1 when activated by Tone 2. The
time interval between the first event (the voluntary action, the
involuntary action, or Tone 2) and the second event (Tone 1) was
set at 250 ms.
Conditions involving the “involuntary action” and “Tone
2” were introduced as control conditions, in order to exclude
the possible presence of IB in such conditions and investigate
whether the results obtained for the voluntary action with the new
paradigm were specific to SoA.
In all of the conditions, the stimuli were presented randomly,
between 3 and 8 s after the trial onset. The stream of letters
stopped randomly between 1.5 and 5 s after the event of interest.
Thirty-three trials per condition were administered, for a total of
330 trials. The first three trials of each condition were discarded
to allow for familiarization and were not included in the analysis.
Each participant performed all of the conditions (BCs and ECs)
in a different, random order over a single session.
DATA ANALYSIS
For each trial, we first calculated a judgment error (JE), which
is the difference between the actual time of occurrence of the
judged event and the perceived time of its occurrence. A nega-
tive JE was interpreted as anticipatory awareness of events (the
participants perceived the event happening before it really did),
FIGURE 2 | (A) Schematic representation of the Baseline Conditions
(BCs) in which only one event (Voluntary Action, Involuntary Action,
Tone 1, Tone 2) occurred per condition. While viewing the stream of
numbers and letters participants had to remember which consonant
was on the screen when: (1) they made a voluntary key-press; (2) they
felt their right index finger moved down passively; (3) they heard Tone
1; and (4) they heard Tone 2. (B) Schematic representation of
Experimental Conditions (ECs). (a) Participants judged the letter that
was on the screen either when they made the Voluntary Action (5) or
heard the Tone 1 (6). (b) Participants judged the letter that was on the
screen either when they felt their right index finger moved down
passively (Involuntary Action, 7) or heard the Tone 1 (8). (c) Participants
judged the letter that was on the screen either when they heard the
Tone 2 (9) or the Tone 1 (10).
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while a positive JE was interpreted as delayed awareness (the
participants perceived the event happening after it really did). For
each condition, a mean JE (mJE), including both negative and
positive values, was obtained. We obtained a total of 10 mJEs,
one for each condition. Since the numerical value of the mJE in
a single condition is generally not informative and difficult to
interpret, the differences between the mJE of an identical physical
event in two different contexts (the BCs and ECs) were calculated
(i.e., the perceptual shift) by subtracting the mJE of each event
in the BC (voluntary action, involuntary action, Tone 1, or Tone
2) from the mJE of the same event in the EC. For example, the
shift of the action towards the tone (i.e., action binding) was
calculated by subtracting the mJE of the voluntary action in the
BC from the mJE of the voluntary action in the EC, whereas the
shift of the tone towards the action (i.e., tone binding) was found
by subtracting the mJE of Tone 1 in the BC from the mJE of the
same Tone 1 in the EC. Therefore, calculating the perceptual shifts
was important to control for the cross-modal synchronization
judgments, which differ widely across individuals. Finally, we
also computed an overall binding measure (Haggard et al., 2002;
Haggard and Clark, 2003; Engbert et al., 2008) by combining the
first (i.e., the action binding) and the second event (i.e., the tone
binding). By calculating 250 ms—(action binding–tone binding),
the obtained value represents the perceived linkage between an
action and an effect, and provides an implicit measure of SoA.
RESULTS
Table 2 summarizes the mJEs, perceptual shifts, and overall
binding.
Using paired-sample t-tests, we first compared the mJE of
a certain event in the BC with the mJE of the same event in
the EC. For example, the mJE of a voluntary action in the BC
was compared with the mJE of the voluntary action in the EC.
Significant differences were only found in the context of voluntary
action (voluntary action in the BC vs. voluntary action in the
EC, t19 = −5.633, p < 0.001, and Tone 1 in the BC vs. Tone
1 in the EC, t19 = 4.138, p = 0.001) (Figure 3). Actions were
therefore perceived later when followed by a tone, as compared
to the BC, in which only the action was presented (Figure 3A).
Differently, a tone was perceived earlier when it was activated
by the action, in comparison to a BC where only the tone was
presented (Figure 3B).
In order to control for cross-modal synchronization judg-
ments, we then calculated perceptual shifts using a 3 (“type of
context”: voluntary, involuntary, and Tone 2)× 2 (“event judged”:
either the first or the second) repeated-measures ANOVA. First,
no main effect of action type was found, F(2,38) = 0.782, p = 0.465,
η2p = 0.040, while the effect of the “event judged” was significant,
F(1,19) = 10.978, p = 0.004, η2p = 0.366, with a shift of the first
event towards the second (28.09 ms) and vice versa (−32 ms).
In addition, a significant interaction between these two factors
emerged, F(2,38) = 21.697, p < 0.001; η2p = 0.533 (Figure 4). We
thus conducted a post-hoc analysis applying Bonferroni correction
for multiple comparisons, in order to examine the interaction
in more detail. The post-hoc analysis revealed that the difference
between the first and the second event judged was only significant
in the case of voluntary action (p < 0.001). In addition, con-
cerning the first event judged, a significant difference was found
for voluntary action, in comparison with involuntary action
(p = 0.004) and Tone 2 (p< 0.001). Involuntary action and Tone 2
were also significantly different (p = 0.041). Significant differences
also emerged when comparing the second event judged (e.g., Tone
1) (“voluntary action context” vs. “involuntary action context”,
p = 0.035; “voluntary action context” vs. “two auditory stimuli
context”, p = 0.002). Such interactions occurred because voluntary
actions lead to a perceptual shift of action towards tone and vice
versa, whereas this effect was reduced for the involuntary action
context and for the two auditory stimuli context.
The repeated-measures ANOVA found a significant effect of
the overall binding (i.e., the perceived linkage between action
and effect), F(2,38) = 21.697, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.533. Post-hoc
comparisons showed a significant difference in both the voluntary
and involuntary contexts (p< 0.001). In addition, the “voluntary
context” and the “two auditory stimuli context” (p< 0.001) were
also significantly different. No significant differences were found
between the “involuntary context” and the “two auditory stimuli
context” (p = 0.205).
In summary, temporal compression (IB effect) was only evi-
dent in the context of voluntary action. The overall binding
data indicate that the participants perceived the interval between
Table 2 | mJEs, perceptual shifts and overall binding in young adults (Experiment I).
Event judged mJE (ms) ± sd Mean shift (ms) ± sd Overall binding (ms) ± sd
Baseline Conditions
1) Voluntary Action (VA) VA 14.25 ± 61.54
2) Involuntary Action (IA) IA 61.25 ± 59.98
3) Baseline Tone (Tone 1) Tone 1 40.75 ± 46.15
4) Control Tone (Tone 2) Tone 2 40.5 ± 44.36
Experimental Conditions
5) Voluntary Action—Tone 1 VA 90 ± 71.49 75.75 ± 60.14 98.75 ± 108.97
6) Voluntary Action—Tone 1 Tone 1 −34.75 ± 71.83 −75.5 ± 81.59
7) Involuntary Action—Tone 1 IA 86.75 ± 62.5 25.5 ± 63.18 208.5 ± 93.16
8) Involuntary Action—Tone 1 Tone 1 24.75 ± 84.78 −16 ± 92
9) Control Tone (Tone 2)—Tone 1 Tone 2 23.5 ± 39.8 −17 ± 46.52 262.5 ± 109.6
10) Control Tone (Tone 2)—Tone 1 Tone 1 36.25 ± 70.2 −4.5 ± 86.75
In the Experimental Conditions the first event (voluntary action, involuntary action, Tone 2) is separated by the second event (Tone 1) by a fixed 250-ms interval.
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Differences in the mJE of Voluntary Action in BC vs. EC
in the young adult group. Error bars represent SEM and * indicates the
significantly difference between BC and EC (p < 0.05). Here
participants perceived the onset time of voluntary action later when it
was followed by the tone (Voluntary Action in EC), as compared to the
BC in which only the action was presented (Voluntary Action in BC). (B)
Differences in mJE of Tone 1 in BC vs. EC in the young adult group.
Error bars represent SEM and * indicates the significantly difference
between BC and EC (p < 0.05). Here, participants perceived the onset
time of the Tone 1 earlier when it was activated by the voluntary action
(Tone 1 in EC), in comparison to the BC where only the tone was
presented (Tone 1 in BC).
FIGURE 4 | Adults’ perceptual shifts in the three main contexts:
Voluntary Action, Involuntary Action and Tones (i.e., the two auditory
stimuli context: Tone 2–Tone 1). Error bars represent SEM. The first event
judged () could be either the voluntary action, the involuntary action or the
Tone 2. The second event judged () was always represented by Tone 1.
Negative perceptual shifts indicate than an event is perceived earlier in an
experimental condition than in the baseline condition; positive perceptual
shifts indicate that an event is perceived later in an experimental condition
than in the baseline condition. Only voluntary actions produce IB (left). On
the middle and on the right the involuntary action and two tones contexts
are represented respectively, showing no IB.
their action and its effect as significantly shorter than it really
was, although no direct judgment of the time interval’s duration
was requested. Overall, our results revealed that, when partici-
pants were actively causing the beep (Tone 1), which was always
presented 250 ms after their voluntary action, the onset of the
voluntary action was perceived as occurring later, as if the action
was “attracted” towards the tone. Analogously, the tone onset
was perceived as “bound” to a voluntary action. This tempo-
ral compression phenomenon was only present in the case of
voluntary action; when the beep followed the involuntary action
or another control beep (Tone 2), such compression did not
occur.
Using a new methodology, we replicated the IB effect and
therefore proceeded to test IB in children (see Experiment II).
EXPERIMENT II
Given the positive results of Experiment I, we decided to use the
new paradigm validated in Experiment I in order to test IB in
children.
METHOD
Participants
Eighteen participants (14 females; mean age in years: 10, SD: 0.97;
education in years: 5.05, SD: 0.87) took part in the study. All
participants were right-handed, as measured by the Edinburgh
Handedness Questionnaire (Oldfield, 1971), had normal or cor-
rected to-normal vision, and lacked neurological and psychiatric
pathologies. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee
of the University of Padua and was conducted according to the
Declaration of Helsinki. Informed consent was obtained from
parents.
Apparatus and procedure
The apparatus and the procedure were the same as those used
in Experiment I. In addition, the participants received basic
neuropsychological screenings in order to exclude children with
cognitive problems, which could interfere with the task. The tests
included the Colored Progressive Matrices (Pruneti et al., 1996),
the Trial Making Test (TMT; forms A, AB, and B—Scarpa et al.,
2006), and the Bells Test (Biancardi and Stoppa, 1997).
RESULTS I: IB IN CHILDREN
All participants had an IQ above 100 and obtained normal scores
on the TMT and Bells Test. Table 3 presents their mJEs, perceptual
shifts, and overall binding.
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Table 3 | mJEs, perceptual shifts and overall binding in children (Experiment II).
Event judged mJE (ms) ± sd Mean shift (ms) ± sd Overall binding (ms) ± sd
Baseline Conditions
1) Voluntary Action (VA) VA −19.72 ± 69.82
2) Involuntary Action (IA) IA 81.39 ± 47.95
3) Baseline Tone (Tone 1) Tone 1 79.17 ± 23.28
4) Control Tone (Tone 2) Tone 2 82.22 ± 49.44
Experimental Conditions
5) Voluntary Action—Tone 1 VA 1.67 ± 74.2 21.39 ± 72.86 169.17 ± 101.65
6) Voluntary Action—Tone 1 Tone 1 19.72 ± 67.11 −59.44 ± 64.39
7) Involuntary Action—Tone 1 IA 72.5 ± 61.05 −8.89 ± 44.73 209.72 ± 93.23
8) Involuntary Action—Tone 1 Tone 1 30 ± 62.47 −49.17 ± 61.29
9) Control Tone (Tone 2)—Tone 1 Tone 2 81.66 ± 33.91 −0.56 ± 52.07 208.33 ± 72.58
10) Control Tone (Tone 2)—Tone 1 Tone 1 36.94 ± 55.18 −42.22 ± 51.63
In the Experimental Conditions the first event (voluntary action, involuntary action, Tone 2) is separated by the second event (Tone 1) by a fixed 250-ms interval.
We compared the mJE of each event in the BC with the mJE of
the same event in the EC using paired-samples t-tests. Significant
differences were only found in the perception of Tone 1 in the
EC compared to the BC, in which the tone was presented alone.
However, these differences were not limited to the case of the
voluntary action (t17 = 3.916, p = 0.001) like in adults; they also
extended to the case of the two control conditions: involuntary
action (t17 = 3.403, p = 0.003) and Tone 2 (t17 = 3.470, p = 0.003).
Tone 1 (i.e., the effect/beep) was therefore perceived earlier when
it followed the voluntary action, the involuntary action, or Tone
2, as compared to the BC.
We also analyzed the perceptual shifts in order to investi-
gate IB, as in Experiment 1. The repeated-measures ANOVA
revealed no effect of action type, F(2,34) = 0.341, p = 0.713,
η2p = 0.020, except for a main effect of the event judged
(F(1,17) = 18.03, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.515) having a larger shift
for the second event towards the first one (−50.28 ms vs. 3.98
ms). The interaction between the two factors was not signifi-
cant, F(2,34) = 1.233, p = 0.304, η2p = 0.068 (Figure 5), indicat-
ing that no temporal compression occurred for the voluntary
action.
When considering the overall binding, no differences were
found between the three contexts (“voluntary action”, “involun-
tary action”, and the “two auditory stimuli context”), F(2,34) =
1.233, p = 0.304, η2p = 0.068.
The results showed that no IB was present in the 10-year-
old children. Although a sort of minimal temporal compression
seems to exist in the case of voluntary action, it does not reach
significance, when compared to the two control conditions.
RESULTS II: BETWEEN-GROUP COMPARISONS
In order to better understand the lack of IB in children, we then
proceeded to compare the degree of binding between the two
groups. Concerning BCs, no differences were found in the “vol-
untary action condition”, t36 = 1.594, p = 0.120, or in the
“involuntary action condition”, t36 =−1.135, p = 0.264. However,
significant differences were found in the case of Tone 1, t36 =
−3.287, p = 0.003, and Tone 2, t36 = −2.742, p = 0.009. In our
study, adults perceived tones better than children.
Concerning ECs, on the other hand, significant differences
were found in the perception of the voluntary action during the
EC, t36 = 3,736, p = 0.001, as well as of Tone 1 following the
voluntary action, t36 = −2.408, p = 0.021, and of Tone 2 in the
EC, t36 =−4.821, p< 0.001.
The baseline differences in the perception of tones can explain
the differences shown in the perception of Tone 1 following the
voluntary action and Tone 2 in the EC, but they cannot account
for the differences found in the case of the voluntary action.
While the adults perceived voluntary actions significantly later
(towards the tone) compared to the BC, in children, although
the direction of the shift was opposite between BC (−19.72 ms)
and EC (+1.67 ms), such changes did not reach a significant level.
We therefore analyzed the perceptual shifts using 3 × 2 repeated
measures ANOVA, using the group (children vs. young adults) as
FIGURE 5 | Children’ perceptual shifts in the three main context:
Voluntary Action, Involuntary Action and Tones (i.e., the two auditory
stimuli context: Tone 2–Tone 1). Error bars represent SEM. The first event
judged () could be either the voluntary action, the involuntary action or the
Tone 2. The second event judged () was always represented by Tone 1.
Negative perceptual shifts indicate than an event is perceived earlier in an
experimental condition than in the baseline condition; positive perceptual
shifts indicate that an event is perceived later in an experimental condition
than in the baseline condition. No temporal compression occurred for the
voluntary action.
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FIGURE 6 | Differences in the voluntary action overall binding between
young adults and children. Error bars represent SEM and * indicates the
significantly difference in overall binding between the two groups. Only
adults present IB effect, showing temporal compression between voluntary
action and its effect.
the between-factor. First, we did not find a significant main effect
of group, F(1,36) = 4.012, p = 0.053, η2p = 0.100. A predicted and
highly significant main effect of the judged event was observed,
F(1,36) = 25.490, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.415, with the first event showing
a delayed shift towards the second (16.03 ms) and vice versa
(−41.14 ms). Most importantly, the interaction between group,
type of action (voluntary, involuntary, and Tone 2), and judged
event (first vs. second) was significant, F(2.72) = 5.242, p = 0.007,
η2p = 0.127. The only significant difference between the two groups
emerged in the case of the action-binding effect (i.e., the shift of
the voluntary action towards the tone) (p = 0.016). No significant
differences were found between the shifts in the other control
contexts.
Also, the overall bindings were compared between the two
groups. No main effect of group, F(1,36) = 0.066, p = 0.799,
η2p = 0.002, was found, but a main effect of overall binding
emerged, F(2,72) = 14.92, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.293: temporal
compression was only present in the voluntary action context
(p< 0.001). A significant interaction between overall binding and
group emerged, F(2,72) = 5.242, p = 0.007, η2p = 0.127. Children
and young adults only differed in the case of the “voluntary action
context” (p = 0.047) (Figure 6).
To summarize, the only significant difference between adults
and children regarded the “voluntary action context”, in par-
ticular, the shift of the action towards the tone. No differences
emerged in the case of the two control contexts. These data are
important for explaining the lack of IB effect in children.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The aim of the present study was to investigate the ontogenetic
development of IB as an implicit measure of SoA, by taking
advantage of its superiority over explicit tasks (verbal self-reports)
(Wolpe and Rowe, 2014).
In Experiment I, a new, reliable paradigm for assessing IB was
introduced and tested in a group of young adults. The results
showed that only voluntary actions were perceived as occurring
later in time than they really were (e.g., as more adjacent to the
following tone in temporal terms); on the other hand, tones were
perceived as occurring earlier than they really were (e.g., closer to
actions in time). Such temporal compression was limited to the
context of voluntary conditions. We considered these results as a
proof of the IB effect.
In Experiment II, we tested the same paradigm considered
in Experiment I in children. The results showed a reduction
of IB, both in the context of “voluntary action” and in the
two control conditions (“involuntary action” and “tones”). This
lack of findings could be explained within the frame of the
“warning-signal hypothesis” (Droit-Volet, 2003, 2011), which
demonstrates that, when target stimuli are preceded by warning
signals, the amount of time required for stimulus processing
decreases and accuracy improves. In fact, when the children
had to evaluate the second event in the ECs (e.g., Tone 1),
judgment accuracy significantly increased in comparison to the
BC, in which only Tone 1 was presented. In fact, in the BC
conditions, children perceived Tone 1 after its real onset; when
Tone 1 was activated by the voluntary action, it was perceived
more accurately. The same pattern also emerged when Tone 1
followed the involuntary action and Tone 2. We therefore spec-
ulated that children could consider the first event (voluntary
action, involuntary action, or Tone 2) to be a warning signal for
the arrival of the subsequent tone. The warning-signal hypoth-
esis found confirmation in developmental studies showing that
a warning event can actually act as an attentional preparation
cue and then lead to performance improvements (Droit-Volet,
2003, 2011). In fact, children are more accurate in judging the
second event in the ECs compared to the BC, in which only
one event is presented at random latencies. On the other hand,
when an evaluation of the first event in the ECs is requested,
no significant differences emerged, in comparison to the BCs.
In this case, the children did not seem to consider the effect
(e.g., Tone 1) following the voluntary action, the involuntary
action, or Tone 2, and only focused their attention on the first
event.
Another possible explanation that is worth taking into account
refers to the “lack of inhibitory control”, which is common in
children. Several classic developmental studies have demonstrated
that the ability to suppress irrelevant information becomes more
efficient with age (Diamond and Doar, 1989; Durston et al.,
2002). As a matter of fact, performance on Stroop, flanker, and
go/no-go tasks continues to develop over childhood and does
not reach its maximum until 12 years of age or later (Carver
et al., 2001; Bunge et al., 2002; Durston et al., 2002). In our
study, the children could have more accurately judged the onset
of the second event in the ECs compared to the BCs because
they were influenced by the presence of the first event, not
because they treated the first event as a warning stimulus (warning
signal theory: Droit-Volet, 2003, 2011). In fact, when Tone 1 was
presented alone in the BC, it was perceived 79.17 ms after its
real appearance. When it was activated by the first event in the
ECs (voluntary action, involuntary action, or Tone 2), Tone 1 was
perceived earlier and, consequently, more accurately, compared
to the BC. When the children had to evaluate the second event
in the ECs, they were not able to disengage their attention from
the irrelevant stimulus (i.e., the first event), which was therefore
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not well-inhibited. For this reason, the second event was perceived
earlier and consequently more accurately, compared to the BC.
Summarizing both hypotheses (the warning signal and the lack
of inhibitory control) could represent a plausible explanation for
our results. However, the lack of an inhibitory control hypothesis
could better fit our data: in fact, in order to control the cross-
modal estimations in timing judgments, we have to consider the
perceptual shifts, not just the difference between the BC and the
EC. Figure 5 shows that the second event seems to be influenced
by the first one: the effect (e.g., Tone 1) is perceived earlier towards
the first event independently, by the context, and the shift is
significantly different between the first and the second event, with
a greater shift for the second one. It is therefore more likely that
the children were unable to manage the interference caused by
the first event and, consequently, to correctly evaluate the beep
(e.g., Tone 1). Judging the second event correctly implies that
attention has to be disengaged from the previously presented
stimulus (i.e., the first event). This hypothesis finds confirmation
in the literature from several studies reporting difficulties in
suppressing activated, but irrelevant, information in children.
In these cases, irrelevant information exploited resources that
otherwise would be available to process relevant information,
which led to global performance decreases (Tipper et al., 1989;
Bjorklund and Harnishfeger, 1990; Rubia et al., 2000; Lorsbach
and Reimer, 2011). A point worth mentioning is the fact that,
in the case of the first event—in particular, the perception of
the voluntary action—something different occurred compared
to the two control conditions. Although this difference did not
reach a significant level, it is worth underlining that the change in
the case of voluntary action was greater in the BC (−19.72 ms)
than in the EC (1.67 ms), When the children had to evaluate the
consonant on the screen when they made the key-press in the BC,
they perceived the onset of the voluntary action earlier than it
really was. On the other hand, when the voluntary action caused
the tone in the EC, the action was perceived later towards the
tone, compared to the BC (1.67 ms). Also, the shift direction was
different: in the BC, the voluntary action was perceived before it
really occurred, while in the EC, it shifted towards the consequent
tone. Such changes did not occur in the two control conditions.
Therefore, it seems that a sort of temporal compression was
developing in the children.
Considering the overall binding (i.e., the perceived linkage
between action and effect), no differences emerged between
the three different contexts (i.e., “the voluntary action context”,
“the involuntary action context”, and “the two tones context”),
although a sort of temporal compression seems to be present in
the case of voluntary action. This lack of effect could be explained
by looking at Droit-Volet’s (2013) and Droit-Volet et al.’s (2004,
2007). First, the children could have encountered difficulties with
this task (as a result of their limited attentional control capacities;
for a review, see Brainerd and Dempster, 1995), particularly with
the stream of visual letters, since the dominance of audition
over vision has been reported in the processing of time (for a
review, see Pouthas et al., 1993). In fact, auditory stimuli could be
captured more easily compared to visual stimuli because audition
is more specialized for processing temporal information. The
second aspect refers to timing sensitivity, which increases with
age and is not completely present in 8-year-olds (for a review, see
Droit-Volet et al., 2006).
In addition, when comparing the data obtained from the
adults and the children, the overall binding pattern of results
within the two groups appears to be different. The two groups did
not differ in terms of control conditions; rather, they only showed
significant differences in the “voluntary action condition”, sug-
gesting that temporal compression only characterizes the adults’
performance (Figure 6). On the other hand, when considering
action and effect binding separately, the two groups only exhibited
differences concerning action binding (i.e., the shift of the action
towards the tone). This result can be explained by considering the
two different processes implicated in action-and-effect binding
(Moore et al., 2010; Wolpe et al., 2013). Effect binding seems
to rely on a pre-activation mechanism (Waszak et al., 2012); the
neural representation of a sensory outcome following a voluntary
action is activated before its occurrence. When the predicted
sensory event occurs, the perceptual threshold is reached faster
than when the event is not predicted. Consequently, estimation
errors are smaller in the ECs than they are in the BCs, leading
to effect binding. On the other hand, action binding depends on
both predictive motor control and inferential processes (Moore
and Haggard, 2008). It could be possible that the pre-activation
mechanism is already fully efficient in children, while mechanisms
implicated in action binding are still being developed.
In conclusion, our research represents a substantial contribu-
tion to the comprehension of SoA mechanisms. First, we repli-
cated the IB effect with a new paradigm that could represent
an alternative to both the Libet clock and the time interval
methods, thus avoiding the problems related to rotating stimuli
and disentangling action binding from effect-binding processes
respectively. In this sense, it is crucial to better investigate the
contribution of predictive (e.g., motor command signals: Wolpert
and Ghahramani, 2000; Blakemore et al., 2001) and recon-
structive processes (the integration of external sensory feedback:
Wegner, 2002) in children by varying the conditional probabilities
of the tones and actions (Moore and Haggard, 2008). Second,
our data improve and corroborate results from the literature on
the ontogenetic development of agency, while going beyond its
basic aspects (body awareness and action–effect learning). The use
of IB as an implicit measure of SoA implies that more complex
cognitive abilities are considered (i.e., executive functions), thus
better depicting the complexity of SoA. In this sense, the present
study is the first attempt to investigate IB as an implicit measure
of SoA, in a group of children using an implicit measure of it.
We found reduced IB effects in children. In fact, although the
patterns of the adults and the children regarding the “voluntary
action context” seemed to be similar, the results obtained from
the children seem to suggest a tendency to be more focused
on voluntary action, without taking the effects produced by it
into account. If we consider IB to be an “adaptive illusion” that
gives us a strong sense of causality and helps us to consider
ourselves as responsible for certain effects, such an illusion does
not seem to deceive children, maybe because the necessary cog-
nitive skills have not been acquired yet (i.e., inhibitory control or
the ability to attend selectively to critical stimuli while ignoring
irrelevant information). These cognitive abilities, which belong to
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the executive functions’ family, are generally connected with the
functionality of frontal areas. Hence, it is possible that children
may not possess IB because such areas, which are fundamental for
the acquisition of the cognitive skills necessary to process IB, are
not developed yet, like in adults. For all of these reasons, we sug-
gest that IB may follow a developmental trend. It may be acquired
gradually during ontogenesis, parallel with the maturation of the
frontal cortical network. Since SoA and IB seem to share the
same common cognitive mechanisms and neural networks (David
et al., 2008; Moore et al., 2010; Moore and Obhi, 2012; Kühn
et al., 2013; Wolpe et al., 2014), we could therefore speculate
that, in conjunction with the reduction of IB, children also show
diminished SoA, which does not allow them to understand the
consequences of their actions. However, our results refer to IB,
and speculations on SoA remain limited. The possible hypothesis
of a link between reduced IB and the maturation of frontal areas
in children remains an open issue that needs to be tested by
means of neuroimaging techniques. Future studies are required
to confirm our hypothesis, in order to provide a further step in
the contextualization of SoA dynamics throughout age.
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